Rn Carriers: Another Take

Started by uk 75, December 07, 2007, 05:40:36 AM

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uk 75

The subject of Post War RN carriers and their aircraft has been batted around on this site and others more than once, but the subject is fascinating and I have some more thoughts.

The problem of providing a decent sized carrier at low cost and sufficient numbers might have been solved in the following ways:

Closer co-operation and work sharing with the US:   By taking on US Essex class carriers and working with the USN to develop a CVS replacement for NATO, the RN could have met its NATO requirements for ASW and fleet support from the 50s to the end of the Cold War

Abandoning the Strike Carrier requirement:  The RN hankered after full sized strike carriers like the US Forrestal class.  CVA 01 was an attempt to get this capability on the smallest possible platform.  However, the requirement to launch full sized air strikes against heavily defended targets required greater numbers of aircraft (the US usually fields at least 2to 3 much larger CVs) than the RN could afford or man.

By focussing on its Cold War NATO role rather than the grandiose East of Suez role, the RN could have developed a medium sized carrier with greater capabilities than the Colossus/Majestic/Hermes vessels or the later Invincibles.
Such as CVS would have carried a mixture of Sea Kings and S3 Vikings, with a Buccaneer/Phantom replacement aircraft deployed in small numbers for fleet defence/offence.  The closest design  for this plane was the BAC 583 (without its VSTOL gimmicks).  Three such carriers, possibly as many as 6 if they had worked out economically, would have served from the late 60s (replacing US Essex interim CVS ships) until the 90s.

UK 75

Zen

I'll bite!

The heat of the problem is overambition, the desire for the biggest possible CV and every time the RN has tried for it, its fallen flat on its face in the attempt.

Yet at every turn there have been reasonable options not persued, but which had they been so, would've survived and likely succeeded.

Start with Malta.
Right from the word go there was the option of a single open hanger Audacious type, using Audacious machinary, it would fit existing infrastructure. Not proceeded with due to the desire for a bigger ship with the new machinary.

Study Y using the new machinary of 180,000shp was also for a open hanger ship, full load around 45,000tons. Roughly the dimensions of Audacious, but the open hanger should equal the area of the two box hangers.
RN choce instead to try for the biggest ship possible.

Then we come not to 1952 but 1948, and talk of a new CV seems strangely dead, yet planning for the major upgrading of the Illustrious class is preceeding.

1950 and the RN wants the Supermarine pre-Scimitar Type525, they can find the money to upgrade Victorious but not to fund it!

Attempts to design the upgraded Implaccable meet various problems.

1952 and we see three seperate developments.
Hooked Swift is ordered!
DH116 Super Venom ordered, DH then says they cannot proceed with it!

These efforts are to extend the development of the Trade Protection CV types like Colossus, and presumably provide bulk airpower to the larger CV's.

But the handle a mass air attack they drop the light aircraft and focus on the heavier twin engine types.

1952 CV study starts.
Had all these components come together the RN could have achieved a lot of what it wants.

Planning studies for the 1952 CV use a navalised Canberra as its nuclear bomber, this being before the NA39 process!

Logic suggests

1953-54 the Meduim Fleet CV studies, two ships a 28,000ton ship and a 35,000ton ship, also a 30,000ton mixed guided missile and carrier vessel.

1954 the RN is faced with a choice between sticking with just the DH110 and its order for one of the developed two seat Scimitars (reheat side-by-side seating, AI.18 radar). But Drops the Scimitar!

Medium Fleet studies continue into 1956, conclusuion is a 45,000ton ship is limited to aircraft of 50,000lb launch weight. Quite where that study comes from or what it relates to I'm not sure.

So step back change the scenario.
Much as I'm loath to admit it, the Type 556 Scimitar seems the solution, actualy ordered as a single prototype.
Sure the DH110 is further along but it terms of development potential the Vickers Supermarine aircraft has more.

Then theres Suez and the aftermath, killing the Saro fighter undermines the case for the Medium Fleet CV, its too small for the numbers of larger heavier aircraft.

So...

IF.
Reasonable Malta is proceeded with their likely to serve into the 1980's. A sort of British mini-Essex.

IF.
Large Carrier studies start in 1948 again, build could start as early as 1950.

IF.
1952 CV is proceeded with Audacious types will not continue beyond the 1960's the new ships are simply much better for modern jets to operate from.

IF.
Medium Fleet CV is ordered RN must accept something lighter than the F4, but these ships could be run through the 1970's.

IF.
SeaSwift happens along with the Super Venom, the drive for larger aircraft is delayed, which is potentialy a good thing considering the pace of development.
It also extend the usefulness of the Colossus Majestic types. Potential even for simply new ships of this type, of which there are some interesting designs.

IF.
the Scimitar enters service earlier it delays the progress towards the Buccaneer.

IF.
Supersonic Scimitar FAW is produced
To win without fighting, that is the mastry of war.

Archibald

1-
QuoteThe subject of Post War RN carriers and their aircraft has been batted around on this site and others more than once

2-
QuoteIF.
Medium Fleet CV is ordered RN must accept something lighter than the F4, but these ships could be run through the 1970's.

1- I agree. It has, but it is still interesting to debate it again and again  ;)  
Maybe we should try publishing a book on the subject ?

2- Zen you know my opinion on this subject.
Three ways : the national way, or the way of foreign designs, which only left France and the USA.

A propos, Zen, I mentioned the debate we have had on the subject of the "Medium fleet CV / Clemenceau cooperative program".
I posted it on the website "France Fights On" and they aparently liked the idea ;)

Voila...



King Arthur: Can we come up and have a look?
French Soldier: Of course not. You're English types.
King Arthur: What are you then?
French Soldier: I'm French. Why do you think I have this outrageous accent, you silly king?

Well regardless I would rather take my chance out there on the ocean, that to stay here and die on this poo-hole island spending the rest of my life talking to a gosh darn VOLLEYBALL.

Zen

#3
During the early 60's theres a 42,000ton CV study, affordable and far less contreversial for the government.

770ft flight deck, its likely to have a 4 degree angled deck on its 165ft width, which comes to a length of 580ft.
This could well be around 800ft overall due to the bridal catcher.
720ft waterline length, 112ft waterline beam.

31ft draught at deep load.
14 SeaVixen 7 on deck, 7 in hanger
4 AEW, 1 on deck, 3 in hanger
31 Buccaneer?! 13 on deck, 18 in hanger

135,000shp for 29.8kts clean, 28kts dirty.

two 225ft long catapults.

Attempting to sketch this, its clear you can park 6 Buccaneers of 63ft length while leaving the angled deck clear, both lifts clear and the forward catapult clear.

This surprised me as Akagi is longer and narrower, but I suspect this is gain the freeboard for a deck edge lift, 24ft seems the minimum for the RN thought needed for a deck edge lift, which is why Victorious does'nt have one with her 14ft freeboard.

All in all this ship fits the infrastructure, and its clear that reducing the Buccaneer numbers should permit COD and SAR aircraft, say down to 24 Buccaneers, 6 ASW, 2 SAR and 2 COD.

This being based on a angled deck of 60ft width, wire clearence line at 80ft width
To win without fighting, that is the mastry of war.

Lawman

At the risk of being hit for suggesting it again, I think the PA58 does show pretty much the best thinking on the subject of the 35-50,000 ton carrier in the era. The PA58 is exactly the right size, allows a good airwing, good hangar, and a good mix of airwing (44 aircraft as we discussed on the other thread should be entirely possible). This would give the UK a working design, in '58, hopefully seeing Eagle and Ark rebuilds cancelled. Instead, the UK buys a total of four PA58s (one-up-man-ship on the French Clem, Foch and PA58), and keeps the four Centaurs (Centaur, Hermes, Albion and Bulwark) all finished to the same spec, i.e. the same as the early '60s Hermes. This gives the UK four light fleet carriers for use as commando and ASW carriers, though with cats and arrestor gear maintained, so they can embark some fixed wing types when needed. It also gives the UK replacements for all its large fleet carriers, with Ark and Eagle retiring in the mid to late '60s as their replacements arrive, and Victorious retiring in 1970. The four fleet carriers are all ordered by 1966, and all in service by 1972, and the Centaurs become the subject of replacement plans in the '70s. These plans see a smaller version of the American Tarawa enter service from the late '70s, and by the time of the Falklands, the UK has one mini-Tarawa available, and one Centaur (Hermes), plus two fleet carriers.  

Zen

Hmmm....thinking

CAS missions seem rather dominant for what seems a worst case scenario, support of an amphibious landing.

CV starts the mission with deep strikes to disrupt defences, the majority of such missions are in this phase.
Then the swtich is over to a majority of CAS missions.

In the CVA-01 effort the planning assumptions moved from 96 aircraft to 64, since machines doing to deep strike (Buccaneer) can then move over to CAS roles (I think called cab rank).

Again this seems to support an airwing of 32.

However these figures might be altered with the addition of the light fighter performing some CAS missions, potentialy reducing the number of heavy strike machines required.
To win without fighting, that is the mastry of war.

uk 75

Deeply fascinating stuff.

I think the debate is understandably focussed on getting the best possible carrier and aircraft for all round requirements to cover the whole Post War period. For reasons we all know well this option was denied the RN by financial and political constraints.  Here are some more thoughts:

Buy American  

The US has the resources and the expertise for large scale carrier operations. The Admiralty were keen to get as much of this for themselves as possible.
The option of purchasing or jointly developing carriers and their aircraft from the US would give the best capability, but be expensive in scarce Dollars and tie us to the US.

Co-operation with France

Given the successful operation of a carrier fleet by France for much of the period, this is another good option. It ought to be possible to come up with a combination of UK and French designs.

UK alone

I am not sure how one bucks history with this one, as most of the designs produced were difficult at best and lousy at worst.  The Buccaneer took a long time to develop and never had the capabilities of the A6 (electronics, weapons etc).
The wartime carrier designs were completely unsuitable for the Post War world and the carrier conversions expensive and time consuming compromises.  Victorious, Hermes, Eagle and Ark Royal were better than nothing, but they were a very bodged way of getting 4 carriers of limited capability.
The 1950s carrier designs and CVA 01 all suffered from trying to do too much with too little.

Good stuff

Lawman

I have to say that the Buccaneer had a lot of unexploited potential, it could have been a British A-6 Intruder equivalent. Add in a TRAM turret, in a retractable form, and you've got the potential to fly shorter range strike missions with heavy warloads, or even carry eight LGBs (four in the weapons bay, and four on the wings). In the opening phase of operations, the dozen Buccaneers fly deep strike missions, accompanied by Phantoms. In later stages, the Phantoms fly top cover, while the Buccaneers fly heavy support missions.

I would love to see the Buccaneer getting a SEAD kit though, possibly just a podded system, with parts shoved into the bomb bay, and a couple of ALQ-99 pods on the wings. A typical Royal Navy 'Alpha Strike' from two carriers consisting of sixteen Buccaneers flying strike profiles (each with six LGBs and a pair of ALARMs), four Buccaneers flying SEAD/jammer profiles, and sixteen Phantoms flying CAP, with four more for recon. This would be a fourty-aircraft Alpha Strike, requiring each carrier to get ten out of twelve Buccaneers, and ten out of twenty-four Phantoms airborne. This would still leave plenty of Phantoms to defend the carrier.

The result of this is that two PA58 sized carriers would be more than enough. To field two carriers, it would be best to aim for four or five total. Six carriers total would allow for three or four carriers to be deployed in emergencies (e.g. the Falklands).  

elmayerle

I've heard the differences between the Buccaneer and the Intruder boiled down to "the Intruder was a common airframe with uncommon avionics while the Buccaneer was an uncommon airframe with common avionics".  It does make you wonder what the Intruder's avionics in the buccaneer airframe could've done.
"Reality is the leading cause of stress amongst those in touch with it."
--Jane Wagner and Lily Tomlin

Lawman

My trouble is that I have always loved the A-6, it is one of my absolute favourites (alongside types like the F-4, A-4, and others), and this means that the Bucc has always been second best in my eyes. I would have loved nothing more than to see a British supercarrier with Phantoms, Intruders, Prowlers, and maybe even Corsairs (given their use of TF41 Spey engines in later marks).

One thing to consider is the differential airwing sizes, relative to the carrier size/cost. Though there were serious considerations in terms of size of docks available (big carrier = big dock, and there weren't any suitable ones for very large carriers), this shouldn't be seen as a major stumbling block. Since we can assume that every carrier, no matter what size (within reason), needs eight support aircraft minimum (four AEW and four ASW helos); this means that the larger carriers have a major advantage. A 35,000 ton carrier (Clemenceau for example) can carry around, say, 32 aircraft, meaning a max of 24 combat aircraft. A 50,000 ton carrier could carry about 50-60 aircraft, depending on arrangement, meaning 40-50 combat aircraft. Indeed, a 65,000 ton carrier would be able to carry up to about 80 aircraft, meaning nearly 70 combat aircraft potentially. The smaller carriers, in order to put together a decent large strike package, need to be operated together, with two or even three carriers ideally. In contrast, the same firepower can be put together from just one very large carrier.

I am not arguing in favour of Britain necessarily getting supercarriers, but it might be worth discussing. Since a smaller number of larger carriers, though individually far more expensive, needs only the same number of escorts as a smaller carrier, but is not needed in such large numbers; it might be worthwhile examining.  

Zen

On the theorectical side, it might have been possible to mount most of the required airpower in aircraft on one 80,000ton Forestal type CV. In fact the RN's desire circa 1952 is just that though obviously somewhat different in spec from USN ships.

four 200ft catapults, three lifts, 1000ft long.

And consequently, one needs just three such CV's to provide continious naval airpower.

However 96 (not ASW or AEW or SAR or COD) by 3 is 288 aircraft, and if its crewed like a Forrestal we're talking 5,000 or so people.

Again in theory this is more efficient per plan, and per person than using two or three smaller Carriers in a cost basis.
And its plausable in terms of personnel to have 15,000 for the carrier fleet.
Though they have 2,550 per Audacious, and rather less on Victorious and Hermes.

But in terms of economics the RN never had a hope of affording three new supercarriers, their associate airwings and running even one through the 1970's, even if your buying from the US.
Though it has to be said this is a workable scenario if the right conditions are met, and using US aircraft types is one possibility.

Besides which by the 1960's it was being realised, they did'nt need 96 machines, since all those missions where'nt flown simultaniously, but rather in at least two phases.

Logic suggests that you could do it with 64 multirole machines from one CV with appropriate support, or 48 from two.
Which in military terms is more distributed and thus less vulnerable. Problem is the more complex the aircraft the larger they are and thus the more demanding on the carrier, a Cv designed for 96 say in 1952-54 might be hard pushed to convert to operating 64 large multirole machines.

Two CV's might only be used together for a limited time, with one continuing for longer. A flexible responce to conditions and one that has its cost saving when only one is actualy being used, cheaper in more limited warfighting circumstances, but more expensive during a larger war.


Thus the RN turns to its 48 aircraft CV and likely 5 such ships as their plan, thinking they can keep two operational simultaniously and three under emergency conditions. It also alows them to distribute their forces during peacetime to place pressure at several locations around the world, where one large CV might not be able to perform such.

Alas for them the limits on its dockyards limit its CV and cause all the problems.
Too small a hull in terms of length make of problems with parking and moving aircraft around the deck. But of course this is dictated by the size of the machines on the deck.
950ft length seems a compromise with a desired three catapults and three lifts, probably about 68,000tons full load, which is rather larger than the 53,000ton '1952 CV' study or 870ft length.

Beside the costs and efficiencies mean that 5 CV's would not be possible to afford or operate through the 1970s, though 3 might survive at low rates of operation.

What I need to find however is how many of the CAS missions actualy need a Buccaneer sized machine to perform it. Its quite possible a smaller machine might do those missions, reducing the need for the large Buccaneers per CV.

USN in the same timeframe had a plethora of types.

Possibly two ships with 32 aircraft (not ASW or AEW or SAR or COD) might do it?

CVA-01 (54,000tons or thereabouts) had a airwing of 36 (not ASW or AEW or SAR or COD), 18 Buccaneer, 18 F4 and longterm 30 OR346 machines. Presumably 36 being 4 more than the minimum leaves some scope for the unknown and the 30 OR346 types would be expected to be more capable than the baseline study that produces these numbers.

Lots more to read and contemplate!
To win without fighting, that is the mastry of war.

Lawman

I agree, I only really raised the 'large CVA' option as an outside choice, on the basis that it would allow an entire air campaign to be handled by one ship potentially. The smaller CVA options are obviously more likely, and if bought early enough, five might be an option.

As for the '70s and carrier survival, I would hope that the government of the day would not actually scrap the carriers, but rather tie them up, hoping to bring them back. The options would either be to mothball two or three, and operate two or three; or alternatively to keep all five semi-operational, but only take one or two to sea at a time. This would hopefully allow all five to be operational when actually needed, with at least three or four actually deployable. Think about a Falklands scenario with three or four large CVAs!

How about a middle ground? We could aim for a slightly modified Midway class, size-wise, i.e. ~50,000 tons light, 60,000 full load; 900ft long at the waterline, and 970ft overall. It would probably be a little narrower, so there aren't such major overhangs, but otherwise would be very similar in size. This should allow for a slightly better airwing, probably around 56 aircraft without problems, allowing up to 48 Phantoms and Buccaneers. This could be either two Phantom squadrons (each of 16) and one Buccaneer Sqn (of 16); or three squadrons of Phantoms (12 each) and a Buccaneer squadron (of 12).

The aim would definitely be to order them from the late '50s onwards, so they actually get built. No messing around with large SAMs either, hence no loss on fantail, which just kills space (hence a 55,000ton CVA would only have carried about 45 aircraft, because the deck and hangar gave up loads of space for the missile systems). The first two carriers are ordered in '58, with two more ordered in '63, and a final one ordered in '67, to allow the final old fleet carriers to retire. Centaur, Hermes, Albion and Bulwark are all to serve on as commando carriers, with Centaur and Hermes assigned as ASW/Commando carriers, to support the Greenland/Iceland/UK Gap, as well as amphibious ops in Norway. Albion and Bulwark are to be operate East of Suez, operating from Australia and Singapore. Of the five CVAs, it becomes normal for one to be based at Gibraltar, doing training cruises in the Med; and one to be on operations in the Atlantic, with a third CVA available at medium readiness for deployment East of Suez.  

uk 75

I love CVA 01, ever since I saw the artist's impression in Jane's 1963-4 Fighting Ships as a schoolboy in the 60s> BUT

Having read exhaustively from the usual suspects, Grove, Brown& Moore, Friedman etc and the marvelous contributions on the websites, I think the Strike Carrier requirement was impossible to realise with the resources and plane types available to the UK> BUT

The US NATO Striking Fleet was always keen for the UK to provide it and convoys with an adequate screen of ASW ships, but with a secondary fleet defence and anti-ship role.  I think this requirement could have been met by three to six purpose built RN 1952 style carriers or the acquisition of late model Essex class ships and later development of a CVS type ship.

This focus on 3-6 ships would have saved much money on the CVA 01, ARK conversions and the Through Deck cruiser programme.  The resulting platforms would have been versatile and the UK could have looked at US aircraft such as the S3 Viking and the F8 Crusader as cheaper alternatives to its own programmes.

France was less pro-NATO and lagged behind in much of the technology which the RN wanted from the USN.  Tempting as the purchase of French style platforms seems, I think the RN was right to go with NATO's main Navy.

Grudgingly I agree with Denis Healey about East of Suez. It is a shame that the lessons of that period have not been learnt.  British troops suffered poor conditions in Aden and Borneo in the 60s. 40 years later they seem even worse off in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The UK needs to learn to allocate resources within its financial means.

The NATO ships I describe above could have met the Falklands Task Force requirements and all subsequent UK out of area requirements better than the three Invincibles/Hermes.

Lawman

Well, to be honest, the 45,000 ton PA58 type should be within the means, and would have allowed a good degree of flexibility. In the strike carrier role, they should be able to carry our 44 aircraft airwing (36 fighter/strike aircraft, 4 AEW and 4 ASW). In the ASW role, they would be able to carry a flight of AEW aircraft, a fighter squadron for self defence, and a dozen each of fixed wing ASW and rotary-wing ASW aircraft.

To be perfectly honest, though, for the pure ASW tasking, the Colossus class light fleet carriers would be enough, since the task is just to carry twenty or so ASW choppers. Centaurs would be plenty for the task, and could embark either a Marine air element, or alternatively a proper ASW air group of British upgraded S-2 Trackers and Sea Kings.

As such, I would aim to keep Centaur, Hermes, Albion and Bulwark for the commando carrier and ASW carrier roles. Two would be East of Suez, and two would be for mostly ASW roles in GIUK and the wider Atlantic. There would then be four (or possibly five) large fleet carriers, all in the same sort of size class as Ark and Eagle, but proper modern carriers. One would be on 'light duties' in the Med, and one on proper duties in the Atlantic (or wherever needed).

The reality is that persuading the British Admiralty in the early '60s to switch from having five fleet carriers, to basically being not much more than an ASW screening force to the US Navy, would be very hard! The best hope remains to just force through a new carrier order, US Navy style - remember the Revolt of the Admirals!  

Zen

Hmmmmm....whats needed really is for the RN to plan and execute the expansion or outright creation of one or more drydocks able to handle large CVs for that route to be persued. Time for that being the 1950's, permitting a new ship to build for the 1960's.

Going back, design X1 seems the final Malta circa 1944 design, 850ft waterline length 897 overall length, but considering how she might be modernised, its possible her length might grow to 950ft, full load displacement of 56,950tons would again grow I suspect. The cut in length of 50ft from design X is driven not just by UK port considerations, but rather from those of Gib, and Malta!
-----------
DAW and DNC seem to come an agreement during the 1952 efforts that 950ft will do, probably around 190ft at its widest.
A 690ft long angled deck.
Power could be as low as 200,000shp, possible with the Y300 unit.
two 200ft and one 151ft catapults.
Quite possible to see this ship around 60,000tons, DNC and Controller believed 55,000tons was the bare minimum, a third lift and various other grows in weight and we may well center here on that 60,000ton figure.
Crew is likely to be 3,000.

Likely this could reduce the changes of the F4-K down to minor ones, if the ship gains DX2 arrestor gear.
Not quite Midway, but rather more than CVA-01.
RN could see this route by pairing one large CV with one small and fusing the small Cv with those of a cruiser for the same sort of studies as real in the early 60's.
----------------------
However,
from my reading the 1952 CV was expected to be crewed by a similar compliment as Eagle, around 2,550, which suggests its possible to keep one operable during the 1970's.
One 151ft catapult, one 200ft unit, makes it in effect a superior Eagle, far more capable than her though.
Building one would likely make new variants of the same ship the solution during the early 1960's, instead of the CVA-01 effort.
Three built is possible.
upgrades might well see, bridel catchers, higher pressure steam catapults, Type 985 radars, DX2 arrestor gear, and a reduced airwing of new more multirole aircraft.

What this ship needs is appropriate aircraft and the UK industry does come up with several designs during the early 60's. Such machines are not impossible or impractical for the UK to develope.
Planning was 12 Sea Canberra, 33 fighters, 8 ASW Gannets, 4 AEW Skyraider, 2 SAR.

Likely this planning would change, Buccaneer is less demanding than the Sea Canberra.

Alternatively, the Scimitar FAW design seems more convertable for the strike role than its single seater day fighter sister, centering on this path, could see the RAF buy some for both FAW and S roles and a successor not needed until the 1970's.

-------------
On the Centaur front one of the possibilities considered during the Korean War mobilisation in 1951 was a repeat Hermes hull for a replenishment/repair CV, in effect a modern Unicorn.
New build Centaur/Hermes types, called them CV-P might then become a real possibility instead.
One could see a deal here with Australia and Canada as Majestic successors, perhaps other states too. This route could even open up a continious production run from the early 50's into the 1960's with more Hermes standard ships produced while Centaur, Bulwark and Albion go the commando role.

Idealy a move there to see one catapult raised to 180ft stroke, and the deck edge lift moved elsewhere.

This route is quite plausable if say the navalised Swift and Super Venom are persued, successors being either developments of the Saro P.177 for service in the early 60's or the P146 for service in the early 70's.
The SAAB Lansen seems a contender too along with the A4, A7 and F8 for the CV-P.
To win without fighting, that is the mastry of war.