RAF F-14 Tomcat

[comrade harps]

Very neat

Useful for defending the Falklands, too.

[Weaver]

The F-4 was already locked in for the RN/RAF before the F-14 became an option. The Tomcat was seriously shortlisted for the post-F4 requirement that was eventually taken by the Tornado ADV (F.3). The primary requirement was long-endurance CAP over the RN's surface ships when they were operating in the GIUK Gap, in the face of intense jamming from large Backfires, Badgers and Bears, thus making a two-seater mandatory. It also couldn't be funded for production until 1985 at the earliest due to the expense of the Tornado GR.1 programme.

The arguments against the Tomcat were:

1. With AIM-54s, it would be horrendously expensive to operate because RAF training requirements demanded one live missile shot per crew per year.

2. Without AIM-54s, it was too big and expensive for an AIM-7 platform. With a cheaper aircraft you could get a bigger force, and hence more aircraft on CAP, for the same expense, and the same sized (expensive!) tanker fleet.

3. The F-14's engines were proving problematic.

4. There was serious talk in the US, at the time that the Brits had to make a decision, about ending F-14 production in 1979.

Some in the RN argued for the RAF to buy 50 F-14s (with Phoenix) with navy money to cover them and make up the rest of the force with whatever they wanted, but obviously that would entail tow separate logistics trains.

Other contenders were:

F-15: would need a whole new combat-capable 2-seater developing to meet RAF requirements, the RAF was unimpressed by it's radar's ECCM capabilities, and it was also having engine problems at the time.

F-16: didn't meet RAF requirements.

Dassault ACA: an entirely paper aeroplane that never, in fact, got built.

F-4 option 1: pay McDD to keep the F-4 production line intact for 5 years after 1979 (when F-4 production was scheduled to end). Obviously money down the drain.

F-4 option 2: buy the F-4 line from McDD and set it up in the UK. Major investment in an ageing platform that was expected to be out-competed in export markets by the F-15 and F-16 in the 1980s.

Hence why I said with Speys.  They would have had to give up the Tornado to get it probably, but I suspect it would have been easier to fit Speys to a Tomcat than it was to redesign the F-4 to use them.  The one live missile shot per year thing would have been a problem if they were using AIM-54s, but they could have just used AIM-7s for the live fire training while retaining AIM-54 capability, but their training would have to be amended to account for that.  The big issue was that the Tomcat was very much a single-purpose aircraft until the mid 1990s, compared with the Tornado that came in interceptor and strike variants.  That could have been remedied, but it wouldn't have been cheap.  Maybe if the Tomcat had gotten the air-to-ground stores management system that the USMC wanted it to have, the process of getting it up to RAF strike specifications would have been easier, but we all know that never happened.

The thing is, the procedures for firing an AIM-54 and an AIM-7 were way different. I suspect that training with the latter wouldn't prepare you for the former.

The work to fit Speys to the Phantom was already done by the time the Tomcat became an option. The Tomcat was only ever considered in the context of a Phantom replacement for the 1985-on timeframe.

There was never a possibility of the Phantom replacement doing strike instead of the Tornado IDS (GR.1). That role was locked in for the Tornado and the money committed. The issue was only ever about replacing the Phantom and the Lighting in the air defence role. The avionics mods done to the Tornado ADV (F.3) rendered it incapable of doing the strike mission anyway, although it was adapted to the SEAD role later in it's life (Iraq invasion), since it had a better RHAWS than the GR.1 and could be retrofitted with GR.1 belly pylons.

Just to be clear, I'm not trying to invalidate Smeds' model, I'm just providing some of the context surrounding what the RAF did IRL and why, for colour. Nothing you or he have proposed is impractical in engineering terms: if the RAF and MoD had chosen to spend the money putting Speys in the Tomcat and training with the AIM-54, then we'd likely have been flying them into the 21st century and patting ourselves on the back for it. Who knows, if the Spey proved more reliable than the TF-30, then the USN could even have opted for it as a low-risk upgrade to their own Tomcats. After all, they'd already had experience with the TF-41 version in the A-7.

[Spino]

The thing is, the procedures for firing an AIM-54 and an AIM-7 were way different. I suspect that training with the latter wouldn't prepare you for the former.

The work to fit Speys to the Phantom was already done by the time the Tomcat became an option. The Tomcat was only ever considered in the context of a Phantom replacement for the 1985-on timeframe.

There was never a possibility of the Phantom replacement doing strike instead of the Tornado IDS (GR.1). That role was locked in for the Tornado and the money committed. The issue was only ever about replacing the Phantom and the Lighting in the air defence role. The avionics mods done to the Tornado ADV (F.3) rendered it incapable of doing the strike mission anyway, although it was adapted to the SEAD role later in it's life (Iraq invasion), since it had a better RHAWS than the GR.1 and could be retrofitted with GR.1 belly pylons.

Just to be clear, I'm not trying to invalidate Smeds' model, I'm just providing some of the context surrounding what the RAF did IRL and why, for colour. Nothing you or he have proposed is impractical in engineering terms: if the RAF and MoD had chosen to spend the money putting Speys in the Tomcat and training with the AIM-54, then we'd likely have been flying them into the 21st century and patting ourselves on the back for it. Who knows, if the Spey proved more reliable than the TF-30, then the USN could even have opted for it as a low-risk upgrade to their own Tomcats. After all, they'd already had experience with the TF-41 version in the A-7.

For TWS shots, yes the AIM-54 was a different beast entirely, but for STT it was basically just a big Sparrow with a limited fire-and-forget capability (more so the AIM-54C than the AIM-54A, the former was more like a big AMRAAM).  I guess it really is just a matter of how much you care about maintaining your existing training syllabus verses modifying it to account for how expensive one of the F-14's primary weapons is.  Just saying that if you absolutely have to shoot one missile per crew per year, Sparrow is still an option even if it's not quite the same as live-fire of an AIM-54. 

With what you've said though, that may change the equation somewhat for the engines.  The F-14B with GE F110 engines came along in 1987, only a couple of years after the beginning of the theoretical replacement timeframe for RAF Phantoms.  So unless the British committed to procurement of F-14s with Speys in the early '80s and had it all working by 1985, then I could see either them just waiting for the F-14B or sticking with the TF-30 (the latter especially if they had gone with the F-111 instead of the Tornado).  Anyway, it's all theoretically possible from an engineering standpoint, but none of it was to be.

[Weaver]

For TWS shots, yes the AIM-54 was a different beast entirely, but for STT it was basically just a big Sparrow with a limited fire-and-forget capability (more so the AIM-54C than the AIM-54A, the former was more like a big AMRAAM).  I guess it really is just a matter of how much you care about maintaining your existing training syllabus verses modifying it to account for how expensive one of the F-14's primary weapons is.  Just saying that if you absolutely have to shoot one missile per crew per year, Sparrow is still an option even if it's not quite the same as live-fire of an AIM-54.

That's all fair: I'm just repeating what the RAF said themselves when they did the analysis. It may be that they were looking for reasons not to buy an expensive aircraft, an American aircraft, or a naval aircraft, or any combination of the above. If "they" (RAF+MoD+Treasury) had decided we really, really had to have the Tomcat, I'm sure they'd have either found the money or adapted the training procedures.

With what you've said though, that may change the equation somewhat for the engines.  The F-14B with GE F110 engines came along in 1987, only a couple of years after the beginning of the theoretical replacement timeframe for RAF Phantoms.  So unless the British committed to procurement of F-14s with Speys in the early '80s and had it all working by 1985, then I could see either them just waiting for the F-14B or sticking with the TF-30 (the latter especially if they had gone with the F-111 instead of the Tornado).  Anyway, it's all theoretically possible from an engineering standpoint, but none of it was to be.

They'd have to commit a lot earlier than that to get Tomcat-specific engine development going though. Such a decision would depend on:

a) The Spey not being capable of further development to match the US engines. I don't see why that should be: they never put an afterburner on the "big fan" TF-41 version, and if my amateur maths is correct, that should have matched the TF-30 for thrust. Fitting a UK engine would be as big a deal for a Tomcat buy as it was for the Phantom: more jobs kept at home (especially with Rolls Royce, the favourite son of all UK governments) and less dollars going abroad.

b) The UK being fully in the loop on US developments with the F-14 and the various engines. That's sometimes been the case and sometimes not. When was the F110 proposed? if it was too late, the UK may have already sunk development money in the Spey, although that wouldn't neccessarily stop us from writing it off in favour of something "shinyer" though...

c) The UK having confidence that the F110 was going to solve all the F-14's problems, and do it better than the Spey. Given that the TF-30 was supposed to be the best thing since sliced bread and then turned out to be a lemon, together with the F-111K debacle, a bit of skepticism might well apply.

[PR19_Kit]

Would the Skyflash have been a half-upgrade from the Sparrow if fitted to an F-14?

[Weaver]

Would the Skyflash have been a half-upgrade from the Sparrow if fitted to an F-14?

Skyflash was much better than AIM-7s up to the F at least, but the improvement was mostly in reliability and homing accuracy: it didn't do anything for range.

As I understand it, the devleopment paths went like this:

Up to the AIM-7E, Sparrow avionics were discreet component. the introduction of solid state avionics greatly reduced their volume, making space available for other things.

For the US AIM-7F, they used the new-found space to move the warhead ahead of the wings, making space for a longer rocket motor for more range. This was appropriate for the USAF in Europe, since they'd be looking at a sky full of Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers coming at them and trying to take out as many as possible before the merge, when numbers and confusion would degrade their technological advantage.

In the UK Skyflash and Italian Aspide, they used the extra space to fit a much more sophisticated and ECM-resistant inverse monopulse guidance system and a better fuse. This was appropriate for the RAF over the North Sea, since they'd be looking at a much smaller number of Soviet bombers with much mosre sophisticated and powerful ECM than tactical types (off topics, but this is also why the RAF was insistent on having a back-seater to drive the radar & ECCM suite in their post-Phantom interceptor).

The US was hugely impressed by the inverse monopulse seeker and set about developing one for themselves. This came along in 1982 with the AIM-7M (M-for-Monopulse, missing out the G-L designations). This managed to put the new seeker into the long-range AIM-7F airframe, getting the best of both worlds, although possibly with less ECCM capability than the European versions (speculation, not confirmed).